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## THE CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA—

*Continued*

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Attempting now to apply these principles it becomes necessary to venture upon a classification of our own. The proposed classification must include a place for all social activities, for the provinces investigated by all of the special social sciences; not at all because sociology is to supplant or absorb those more limited investigations, but because the sociologist, if anyone, must chart the whole territory of social activities; and more especially because sociology seeks those conclusions which issue from a synthesis so wide as to involve all the provinces of social reality, aiming to trace those principles of causation which are equally operative throughout the whole area.

Under the headings in the following classification additional subdivisions can be inserted as minuter analysis may require.

### A. KINDS OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

that is, of specific, prevalent, conscious activities, the problem-phenomena of sociology.

I. *Social activities in which feeling, or the affective element is predominant.*

Every kind of human experience-activity may contain a value element, by virtue of which the experience is, to the one experiencing it, either good or bad. These value elements could no more be described to one who had not felt them, than particular sensations of sight or hearing can be described to one born deaf or blind, yet being common possessions of similarly environed and normal members of our species, they are as intelligibly named as sensations are, and "joy," "pain," "the pleasure of meeting an old friend," are as intelligible phrases as "blue," "pungent," "the taste of pineapple"; and the experiences in which these value elements are found are describable in terms

of their occasions, as "meeting an old friend," their manifestations as "laughed and wept by turns for joy," and in terms of common experience, as "joy." Now it is not the purpose to classify under the present heading the value elements that are to be found in human experience, but rather the concrete social activities in which those elements occur as a predominant factor. These include :

1. *Specific likes and dislikes.*

a) Economic "usages," the wants exhibited in economic consumption.

b) The tastes which are ministered to by the "fine arts." Artistic tastes and economic wants shade into each other; a single article which is both useful and beautiful, like a carved table, or any other product of the art-crafts or *Kunstgewerbe* ministers to both at once.

c) Likes and dislikes which prompt the activities of play and recreation.

d) Tastes which appear in the requirements of etiquette and in ceremony.

2. *Standards of success*, that is, of *ambition*, or the success of the individual as judged by himself, and of *reputation* and fame, or the success of the individual as judged by his associates.

Success is the attainment or possession of that which is desired; the object desired is the standard of success.

Tastes, moral judgments, and ambitions, all three, are often thought to be native to the human breast and common to mankind; yet they vary from group to group, from era to era, and from place to place. Nor is this merely because a taste or approval or ambition is latent till the proper object of it is invented or discovered. On the contrary introduction to the objects which strangers like is far from certain to evoke similar emotional response, and even within the group old tastes and approvals become obsolete. These three predominantly emotional classes of activity are typical social phenomena, which vary from society to society, within the wide limits set by human nature, according as they are determined by a social conditioning. What the indi-

vidual desires, aside from physiological promptings, depends mainly on what his group regards as success, suggests as desirable, and pursues. Likewise the same set of categories which serve for the classification of the standards according to which social approval and fame are accorded, serve also for classifying the standards upon which the individual bases his own self-approval, for there is no *class* of ambitions that has not been somewhere an object of social approval.

The social facts to be tabulated here are complex activities including three elements: first, concepts defining objects of desire; second, judgments as to their desirability; third, the corresponding responses of feeling and impulsion. This group of social phenomena are not the activities which are prized as successful but the activity of defining, approving, and prizing certain activities as successes. For example, the economic activities by which wealth is amassed belong in quite another class, but the prevalent social activity of making the possession or acquisition of great flocks and herds, or of broad lands, or of wealth in general, one of the popular conceptions of success and bases of personal prestige and influence, falls here. Since wealth existed there probably never was a time or place where wealth and the power to get it were not regarded as a form of success. There may still be peoples among whom wealth by itself is regarded as a satisfactory success and a worthy ambition. Some of the other standards of success enumerated appear later, and are less generally regarded and less firmly established in popular esteem. Some are waxing, some have waned at times. And no part of the description of a people, not even the description of their moral code, is more significant than that which portrays their standards of success, and the relative zeal with which they are popularly prized, and no reform is more fundamental than a shifting of emphasis in a people's standards of success.

Standards of success which are socially defined, approved, and desired include: (*a*) physical prowess; (*b*) gratification of appetites and tastes; (*c*) wealth; (*d*) power over men, of which a special form is (*e*) personal charm and influence, which has numerous aspects between which social judgment discriminates,

now in favor of one, now in favor of another; it may rest upon (1) the mere fact of some other form of success, (2) a sort of hypnotic quality in appearance, manner, or speech, which concentrates attention upon its possessor, (3) intellectual value in his utterances, (4) moral qualities which inspire affection and trust, or any combination of these; (*f*) domestic efficiency; (*g*) achievement in art, ceremony, or amusement; (*h*) literary achievement; (*i*) scientific achievement; (*j*) military achievement; (*k*) achievement in politics or other organization; the word achievement must be understood to include "position" which is supposed to imply achievement, or the power of achievement; (*l*) sanctity, excellence in religious observance, and experience; (*m*) goodness and usefulness.

The standards of ambition and reputation of a sect within a larger society may differ from those of the larger society in general in the estimate placed upon this or that object of desire. Furthermore an individual, by reason of peculiarity of hereditary disposition or peculiarity of the social contacts or other conditions of experience to which he has been exposed, may differ in his standards from the group of which he is a member. In that case the standards of ambition and of reputation would not exactly coincide for him. Nevertheless men do prize the esteem of their fellow-men, and feel the desire for it as a motive influencing their conduct, even when that esteem is based upon standards which they themselves do not exactly share. Thus, for example, a man who cares most for intellectual achievement may enjoy and seek the admiration which he can win by athletic prowess from persons who value it more highly than he himself does. It may indeed be questioned whether a man can desire reputation for any quality or success which he does not in some degree value, that is, whether he can desire such reputation for its own sake and not merely as a cause of good treatment from others or a means of control over others for some ulterior end. However, that which a group regards as success for that very reason becomes desirable to the individual members of the group (1) because it brings with it social standing, power, and reward; (2) because when sought for these

reasons success in the pursuit brings the sense of power and self-approbation, which is itself a reward and a motive of endeavor; and (3) because the judgment of the group as to its intrinsic desirability tends powerfully to be the judgment of any individual born or even migrating into the group; and all this is true even when the judgment of the group is most foolish, so that an achievement which is not in itself good or desirable becomes really desirable for the individual simply because it is so regarded by the group. Thus a group may be wholly on the wrong track as to the true aims of life, but its erroneous judgments determine the activities of its members. The group causes the ambitious endeavors of its members to be turned in whatever direction the group judgment marks out as the path of success, whether the pursuit of head hunter's trophies, or of plethoric fortunes, or of saner aims.

Though the standards by which the group judges its members are, *ipso facto*, the standards by which individuals judge their neighbors, and though they tend to coincide with the standards by which the individual judges himself, still his standards for judging himself and for judging others may not coincide exactly. This is not only, as above indicated, because of peculiarity of heredity or of social contacts, but also because there are various forms of success and each has to select for himself those to which he himself will chiefly aspire, but this does not prevent him from admiring other forms of success achieved by others. And it is also in part because self-interest may make one a rebel against the standards of his own group.

This latter fact might lead us to separate goodness from success and to say that goodness is that which God desires for man, or society desires for its members, and each desires for his neighbor, but success is that which each desires for himself. Yet I think we must see that goodness is a form of success, since some at least do desire it for themselves, and it is true of the other forms of success that not every one of them is desired by everybody, and since as just shown the attainment of that which one's neighbors appreciate and reward is itself a success, and since the more men's desires are determined by reflection rather than

primary impulse, the more men must desire for themselves that goodness which is simply the disposition and conduct that results in securing on the whole and in the long run the largest attainment of human ends. Therefore progress in social intelligence if carried far enough brings with it an increased desire for goodness on the part of the individual member of society, and a decrease in the divergence between what society desires for its members and what its members desire for themselves. This is in part because the dictates of righteousness are seen to be no arbitrary demands but the method of attaining the rational ends of individual and social life, and only those requirements which are so understood are recognized as demands of righteousness. And it is in part because a society thus enlightened has become wise enough to make the way of its transgressors hard, to refuse applause and even tolerance to evil forms of success, and adequately to appreciate and reward right and difficult conduct, as it long has appreciated and rewarded the courage of the soldier. At first these social rewards and punishments are externally inflicted, and of course may therefore be desired only for policy's sake. But even so the goodness thus rewarded is a form of success and the social rewards and punishments are subtle and pervasive, extending to the most intimate personal relationships and causing life to blossom or to blight. And finally the accepted standards of the most intimate groups in which one grows from childhood and continues till age make the standards of *self-judgment*.

Two persons or two societies may equally desire goodness yet have very different conceptions as to what constitutes goodness, just as they may equally desire physical gratification or personal charm, or achievement in art, while their ideas of physical gratification differ as widely as those of the blubber-stuffing Eskimo from the Parisian, and their ideas of personal charm or artistic conventionality as widely as those of the painted savage from the Greek. It must be remembered that we are cataloguing complex, concrete activities which include defining objects of desire, ranking them as to desirability, and the desires themselves which are evoked by the objects of desire defined.

The activity of defining, prizing, and desiring goodness is here classed among those activities in which feeling predominates. Its most conspicuous element is the feeling of abhorrence, or of sympathetic affection, respect, and reverence toward certain forms of disposition and conduct, as witnessed in others or as recognized in one's self. Yet these feelings, like others, are based upon a perception or judgment, in this case either a perception of acts themselves directly shocking or winsome to man's natural sensibilities developed in the process of evolution as partial guides to conduct in simple universal age-old relationships, or else a judgment concerning the consequences to be expected from human traits and conduct, a judgment which may be dim or clear, based upon experience and common-sense, or upon the insight of genius, or upon the prevision of science. Judgment, as compared with feeling, is a larger element in the moral activities of those leaders who stir up the abhorrences and appreciations of their fellows, and bind moral requirements upon the consciences of men, than it is in those of the mass. Yet even in the mass of such a socially enlightened people as may sometime exist, the proportion of judgment to feeling, and justice to sentiment, and far-sighted guidance to short-sighted sympathy, may be far greater than it is among any people today.

In such a society the idea of goodness would tend to coincide with the idea of usefulness, and usefulness to take the various forms of achievement, accompanied by sympathetic kindness, and to carry with it charm and influence.

The most notable subdivision within the moral activities (defining, prizing, and desiring goodness) are: (1) those based on the instincts (particularly sympathy and sociability), as stimulated by simple perception of persons; (2) those based upon a more farseeing perception of the conditions of welfare, the requirements of rational reliability, the conduct which all must require of each as the method of satisfactory social life.

II. *Sciences and creeds.*—Sciences and creeds are closely related. Men early acquire bodies of doctrine, but it is only slowly that they build up sciences and scientific arts, to replace the mythologies that had answered the mind's hunger for ex-



planation and the rain-making, divination, conjuring, propitiatory ceremonies and observance of lucky forms of conduct, which had answered the need to "do something about it" in life's practical affairs. Science as distinguished from creed is a relative term. Teachings are scientific in proportion as they are the result of a thorough and convincing application of the scientific methods of observation, inference, and experiment or critical comparison, and so in proportion to the completeness with which they present particular phenomena in their essential relations to other phenomena; and a teaching that today is the most scientific that we have on a given subject, tomorrow may be replaced by newer science if more thorough investigation yields results incongruous with it. The scientific mind is one which *progresses* with the extension of the frontiers of comprehension toward correspondence with objective reality, a correspondence which is approached by the continual testing of our notions by the realities themselves. Science advances most rapidly in fields most open to observation and experiment, namely, the fields of sensible phenomena, but the practical need is perhaps quite as urgent in the fields of psychic reality.

Activities included under the heading creed and science may be divided into three parts:

1. Those relating to material phenomena inorganic and organic.

2. Those relating to psychic phenomena including the social realities. In discussing the ethical valuations or standards of success, culminating in ideas of goodness and usefulness, I remarked that while the element of feeling predominates in these valuations as they prevail among the mass of men, yet they contain an element of judgment and even of science. Just where the division should lie between the activities falling under the head of feeling and those relating to cognition is a matter of fact to be determined by observation.

3. Those relating to matters which are beyond the sphere of observation.

III. *The arts of life*, the applications of the sciences and creeds.

1. In the acquisition and manipulation of material things: (*a*) extraction; (*b*) transformation; (*c*) transportation; (*d*) communication; (*e*) personal service, including self-service, from bathing and barbering up to and including the hygienic, medical, and surgical arts; (*f*) personal aggression; (*g*) theft; (*h*) giving.

2. Practical arts in the acquisition and manipulation of psychic possessions.

*a*) Methods of thought and proof. The chief principles for the guidance of thought which have widely prevailed are four:

(1) Animism, or the belief that whatever is was made and whatever occurs is the deed of a doer, "maker" and "doer" being conceived in terms borrowed from knowledge of animals and men.

(2) Authority, the notion that thought is to be guided by previous thought rather than by fresh revelations or fresh observation and inference, and that ideas can be proved by showing that they harmonize with, or can be deduced from, the authoritative body of thought already possessed. The authoritative body may consist of "supernatural revelations" or not. When either a past revelation or the sayings of the Talmud, or of the Koran, or of the Fathers and of Aristotle, or of dead mandarins, or of any other teachers whose venerated utterances have become "classic" are accepted as major premises of the thought of a people, then this second principle of thought-guidance prevails among men. This is by no means the same thing as accepting the guidance of contemporary experts, though the latter may degenerate and become slavish. The difference is twofold: first, contemporary authority is not crystallized, rigid, and unprogressive; second, the individual thinker selects, it may be on thoroughly rational grounds, between contemporary authorities, and in so doing indirectly selects his own beliefs, while in a society that is in bondage to dead thinkers the particular thinkers whose dicta are to be regarded as final are selected for the individual by society.

(3) System. The principle that thoughts are to be tested

by their systematic coherence may prevail where there is active and fertile intellectual life but limited knowledge. Animism has been outgrown, early bonds of authority have been burst, and no new authority has as yet been clamped upon the mind; but mental activity is speculative, and the slow-growing fruits of painstaking methodical observation have not been gathered, so that hypotheses do not result from wide acquaintance with facts, and are not tested by fact and experiment, but by their consistency with each other. If desire for the practical reaction of belief upon the mind, in comfort or stimulus, prompts the formulation of speculations, and especially if either for this reason, or because of the native predisposition of the thinker, imagination is more active than logic, mysticism is the natural result; but if curiosity, the zeal to comprehend, be the motive of speculation, and logic stronger or more strongly prompted than fancy, the natural result is exemplified by Greek philosophy.

(4) The scientific method, sometimes called positivism, reliance on observation, and inference, tested by observation. A population cannot depend upon this principle of thought-guidance until it has become rich in the stored fruits of extensive observation.

b) Arts of communication and dissemination, including: (1) language; (2) literary and rhetorical arts; (3) the negative arts of secrecy and the arts of deception; (4) pedagogy; (5) arts of self-culture.

c) The fine arts and play: (1) music; (2) painting; (3) sculpture; (4) architecture, as distinguished from building and structural engineering, which are economic activities falling under a previous head; (5) art crafts and decoration; (6) etiquette, ceremony, and ritual; (7) activities of those who by attendance, performance, or management maintain the social practices of the theater, the circus, the race course, professional athletics, and other entertainments and exhibitions; (8) amateur athletics, including contests and competitions depending on physical strength and skill, and all artificial bodily exercises; (9) games of mind and chance, as chess and whist and dice; (10) outdoor locomotion without athletic competition as a form of

play, including the customs of riding, driving, sailing, automobil-ing, bicycling, swimming, walking; (11) return to primitive industries as play, including hunting, fishing, gardening, stock breeding. The advanced industries may also be pursued as play. The distinction between work and play is not found in the overt activity but lies in the purpose and subjective attitude of the person working or playing. Work and play are different enough whether individually or socially considered, yet they can mingle and overlap until the only separation between them is in many cases one between distinguishable elements in the same experience; and individual and social progress imply that more and more of our work shall become play and of our play become work; (12) gambling; (13) drinking, and other drug practices intended to stimulate the nervous system into the simulation of naturally pleasurable experience; (14) feasting; (15) dancing; (16) social reunions; (17) sex indulgence.

3. Arts of organization and administration. These employ psychic realities (human activities) as means to ends, or treat them as imperiling ends and so requiring to be prevented, suppressed, or escaped. Organization as an art is the technique of correlating the differentiated activities of a plurality of persons into a working system, adapted to serve the purposes either of the whole number engaged in the different activities or of some part of them; activities are correlated in this sense when each activity in the system either is directed by the intention to elicit or prevent or direct other activity, or derives heightened practical effect from its designed relation to other activity in the system. There are five principal fields of organization, each of which has developed special arts, namely:

a) Political organization: originally the exercise of sovereignty—in foreign relations, primarily war; and in preservation of domestic order, primarily maintenance of the slavery of the conquered, and settlement of feuds between members of the group, mainly by inflicting upon the party adjudged in the wrong vengeance less likely to provoke retaliation than that which would otherwise be inflicted by the aggrieved, and vengeance upon violators of group custom or sentiment; later also the adaptation of

organization, developed for such exercise of sovereignty, to diverse additional aims, more or less dependent upon the backing of sovereignty, especially as exhibited in the taxing power.

*b)* Domestic organization. In patriarchial societies the family may be identified with political organization. The conscious adjustment of the activities of lovers and possible lovers, and of spouses to each other, and of parents to children, of children to parents, of children to each other, and of all the others to grandparents, is one of the most important, and by no means the easiest field for the exercise of organizing ability. Perhaps no other application of the art of organization goes farther to determine the entire social life of a population. And though the arts of family organization may often be but simple arts, yet there is hardly anywhere, if indeed there is anywhere at all, a people among whom they have not been the object of much care, and they continue in the most highly developed societies to be the object of deep solicitude, of rational idealism, of cherished customs and institutions, and to reward the finest individual skill.

*c)* Religious organization. Religious organization is especially peculiar and interesting. It is remarkable for the immense variety of the activities which it correlates. It is not without significance that the word "hierarchy" comes to us from this source. The main subdivisions of organized religious activity are (*a*) creed and teaching, (*b*) ritual and observance, (*c*) polity.

*d)* Economic organization. The uninitiated by no means realize how far success in a big business consists in organization, still less perhaps how thoroughly correlated are all business activities little and big, even those of the lonely cobbler in his basement and the tiller of the isolated farm being knit by many strands into a web of interlacing activities that covers the continent and spreads over the seas.

Especially it is to be observed that exchange is a branch of the art of economic organization. Exchange is the art of correlating the valuations, acceptances, and relinquishments of owners. With reference to its nature as an art, it cannot be classed with

extraction, transformation, and transportation among the arts for the manipulation of material things; exchange is as truly an adjustment of human activities as any of the arts of organization. The salesman aims to modify and adjust psychic realities as truly as the politician. In the fact that he endeavors to influence psychic states he is like a lawyer or a teacher, far more than he is like a farmer or a carpenter in handling material things. It is true the salesman manipulates psychic realities frankly as a means of getting possession of material things; but so, often do the statesman and politician, and the definition of organization is correlation of activities as a means to an end, and it is no less an art of organization whether *the end* sought is of one sort or another.

e) Organization of public opinion and public sentiment. Public opinion is concerned with political, economic, and religious interests, etc. For that reason it may be objected that it should not be enumerated by itself but should be regarded as one phase, now of political, now of economic, organization, etc. It is true that public opinion is a means to all social ends, but so also is economic activity, and this does not prevent either from being abstracted from the tangled social whole to be studied by itself. The organization of public opinion employs the arts of the teacher, writer, and public speaker, and all the activities of dissemination, as economic organization employs the technic arts; as the latter organizes the factory and the store, the former organizes the school, the press, the library, the museum, and the lyceum.

These are agencies of the formation of public opinion even when managed for gain. When their public function is *sacrificed* to money-making they are prostituted.

The isolated writer and public speaker, like the isolated cobbler and farmer, are taken up into an organization which is quite beyond their own planning. There would be public opinion, and it would be determined by a correlated mass of activities, the agencies of social suggestion,<sup>21</sup> even though there were no art in the organization of public opinion but only an undirected process

<sup>21</sup> Cf. the definition of "social suggestion" given under a later heading.

of natural causation. But the fact of human experience is that societies early develop a technique for the formulation of public opinion and public sentiment. In part it is in the hands of rulers, priests, mandarins, and various authorities. In part it is practiced by the mass of the people, who in the various relations of life (but especially as parents) suppress certain suggestions and incitations and emphasize others, partly in obedience to the leadership of the authorities, and in part under the guidance of a common sense of what will promote and what will endanger those ideas and sentiments which are the foundation of the social order.

This subject largely occupies Professor Ross's book on *Social Control*, and Professor Cooley's book entitled *Social Organization, a Study of the Larger Mind*, two of the most illuminating contributions to sociology thus far produced.

Here might follow a classification of the socio-physical phenomena, or the material works of men in which prevalent social activities are bodied forth. In the ethnological museum, where the utensils, weapons, art products, records, ceremonial appliances, and models of the buildings of different peoples are displayed side by side, is a collection of socio-physical phenomena. A special classification of such phenomena might not be without value, but the material works of men have their significance for sociology either as manifestations of the prevalent psychic activities, or as technic conditions affecting those activities. As technic conditions they have already had mention. And as manifestations of the social activities their classification may be allowed to correspond to the classification of those activities which has already been given.

#### B. MODES OR TYPES OF CHANGE IN SOCIAL ACTIVITY

##### 1. Social activity of a given kind may vary *in strength*.

a) A creed, doctrine, or rule of practice may be held with tremorless faith in its validity and adequacy or may barely exclude a rival and conflicting notion. An individual or a population may be strong or weak because equipped with firm convictions or only with faintly adopted hypotheses.

b) A sentiment may be hot and compelling or lukewarm.

Tastes, approvals, and disapprovals, standards of success and prestige may but moderately prefer this to that, or they may be zealous and urgent.

2. A given social activity may vary *in extent*. Starting from an isolated innovation it may become cosmopolitan, or having been "all the rage" it may decline to an occasional survival, and disappear. The extension of social activities is mainly by imitation, suggestion, or social radiation, but it may also be due in part to multiple independent origination, so that the radiation is from more than one center.

3. As species of animals and plants show some degree of organic variation, no two specimens in an herbarium being quite alike, so also social activities of a given kind are repeated with variation, the Methodism of no two Methodists being precisely identical, nor the Republicanism of two Republicans, nor the carpentry of two carpenters; and a prevalent activity changes in the *degree of uniformity* with which it is repeated; by assimilation related activities acquire a high degree of uniformity, and highly integrated activities may undergo a process of disintegration and diversification.

4. Prevalent social activities vary in another important way that is clearly distinguishable from variation in strength, extent, or degree of uniformity, and which is due to an alteration in the psychic overtones by which they are accompanied. Throughout the change the activity continues to be of the same kind, but there are added to it, or subtracted, minor accompanying activities, which may be of various kinds, such as approvals, condemnations, or organization of the participations in the activity. Owing to these changes in its accompaniments or its included minor elements, an activity, though remaining of the same kind, may appear in various *phases* of which the chief are:

a) Innovation, which is not a "prevalent" activity and is a social activity only by virtue of being socially caused or conditioned and at least potentially a source of social influence.

b) Fashion.

c) Custom.

d) Institution.



e) Rational eclecticism.

f) Organization.

Without tarrying here for complete definition, it may suffice to say that whenever a triumphant fashion has for the most part outlived its competitors, if they existed, so that it furnishes the pervasive suggestion defining what is to be done under given circumstances, when it has acquired the patriotic or group sanction of "our way," and more especially the emotional sanction of familiar use and wont which tends to make deviation from it appear grotesque and repugnant, then we have no longer a mere fashion but a custom.

A custom becomes an institution when its prevalence depends not alone on suggestion and emotion, but upon a practical judgment which has grown up about it and entered into it, stamping it as the adopted method of attaining a desired end, as such, to be defended and supported. In order that activities may truly be regarded as institutional this judgment as to their peculiar fitness and the importance of the ends they serve must be shared by a group large and powerful enough to dominate an entire population. Institutional activities are, therefore, likely to secure political sanction, but I would not, like Professor Giddings, make political sanction the origin and essence of all institutions.<sup>22</sup> This may be the popular illusion about institutions, but I think it is opposed to the facts. A tyranny established by conquest is not an institution of the people upon whom it is forced, and the sanction of such a government cannot make the institutions of the people. On the contrary, the judgment of the people can maintain their institutions in spite of the indifference and in some degree even in spite of the persecutions of government; on the other hand, the popular judgment can at length adopt the existing government and cause it to become an institution. A group judgment approving some practical end which is attained by a customary activity, combined with another group judgment adopting that customary activity as the method of attaining that end, together constitute a social fact of the utmost significance. A custom into which such judgments have entered is a widely different reality from a custom which lacks

<sup>22</sup> Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, 184. Contrast Sumner, *Folkways*, 53-54.

them and the difference is the essential distinction between a mere custom and an institution.

It is not necessary that a social activity be either an innovation, a fashion, or an institution. It may prevail, not by the charm of fashionable novelty, or of familiar custom, but because though rejected by many it is by many others selected and practiced; and that not because those who adopt it belong to a sect or section of society whose group judgment approves it, but because as individuals they have adopted it each for himself as a result of his own deliberation and criticism. Such a social activity has reached the phase of rational eclecticism.

Whether or no an institution is always organized, certainly an organization is not always an institution, but organization is by itself an additional phase of social activity. The nature of organization has already been discussed under the heading "*practical arts*."

Adequate social description must take account not only of the kinds of social activity but also of the variations in strength, extent, degree of uniformity, and phase of the activities of any given kind.

### C. CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

I. *Geographic*.—The natural physical environment including such items as (1) aspect; (2) climate; (3) soil; (4) minerals; (5) flora; (6) fauna; (7) topography, including the determination of direction and degree of facility in travel and transportation; (8) distances, internal and external.

II. *Technic conditions*, or the material products of human activity.

1. Wealth (other than purely natural): (*a*) its forms, with reference to the purposes for which it is adapted, and the excellence or imperfection of the adaptation; buildings, means of transportation, etc.; (*b*) its amount; (*c*) its distribution or ownership and right of use, including public ownership and that partnership between individuals having a special claim and the general public which is represented by taxation, the government control of privately owned common carriers, etc.

2. Population: (*a*) numbers; (*b*) distribution in space, for example, sparse rural alternating with dense urban in given proportions, etc.

III. *Physiologic qualities* of the individuals composing the population. These are of two classes:

1. Hereditary, that is either present or predetermined at birth; including (*a*) age; (*b*) sex; (*c*) race; (*d*) congenital diseases and defects; (*e*) psychic predispositions, that is tendencies of the organism toward varieties of activity which appear in consciousness, and which are commonly referred to as matters of "temperament" or "natural endowment."

2. Acquired, including (*a*) many forms of disease or defect, as well as (*b*) special strength and skill, and (*c*) those organic modifications which prepare for the ready performance of certain conscious activities, and make others difficult, and which are referred to as "second nature," "disposition," and "habit."

Examples of acquired physiologic conditions appear in the contrasts between the physical condition of an agricultural and manufacturing population of the same stock, or in the effects produced upon a people by a prevalent drug habit. Any prevalent habit, if it be a true habit, is itself an acquired physiological modification of the people affected, and may be quite as significant as a hereditary trait or predisposition. Habit and custom are totally distinct orders of phenomena. The existence of a custom in a society may or may not result in a habit common to many of its members, but the presence of such a habit, wherever it exists, will help to perpetuate the custom. The distinction between hereditary and acquired traits, in so far as it can be made, is of great importance both scientifically and practically.

Physiological variations mark the varieties of mankind, and so cause specific variations in the social activities; but the physiological traits which are common to man as man underlie and determine whatever is universally instinctive or normal among mankind, including some degree of sympathy and sociability, and the logical processes.

IV. *Psychic conditions.*

[To be concluded]